Abstract. We characterize the complexity of the safety verification problem for parameterized systems consisting of a leader process and arbitrarily many anonymous and identical contributors. Processes communicate through a shared, bounded-value register. While each operation on the register is atomic, there is no synchronization primitive to execute a sequence of operations atomically. We analyze the complexity of the safety verification problem when processes are modeled by finite-state machines, pushdown machines, and Turing machines. The problem is coNP-complete when all processes are finite-state machines, and is PSPACE-complete when they are pushdown machines. The complexity remains coNP-complete when each Turing machine is allowed boundedly many interactions with the register. Our proofs use combinatorial characterizations of computations in the model, and in case of pushdown-systems, some language-theoretic constructions of independent interest.
Introduction
We conduct a systematic study of the complexity of safety verification for parameterized asynchronous shared-memory systems. These systems consist of a leader process and arbitrarily many identical contributors, processes with no identity, running at arbitrarily relative speeds and subject to faults (a process can crash). The shared-memory consists of a read/write register that all processes can access to perform either a read operation or a write operation. The register is bounded: the set of values that can be stored is finite. We do insist that read/write operations execute atomically but sequences of operations do not: no process can conduct an atomic sequence of reads and writes while excluding all other processes. The parameterized verification problem for these systems asks to check if a safety property holds no matter how many contributors are present. Our model subsumes the case in which all processes are identical by having the leader process behave like yet another contributor. The presence of a distinguished leader adds (strict) generality to the problem.
We analyze the complexity of the safety verification problem when leader and contributors are modeled by finite state machines, pushdown machines, and even Turing machines. Using combinatorial properties of the model that allow simulating arbitrarily many contributors using finitely many ones, we show that if leader and contributors are finite-state machines the problem is coNP-complete. The case in which leader and contributors are pushdown machines was first considered by Hague [18] , who gave a coNP Supported by the Spanish projects with references tin2010-20639 and tin2012-39391-C04.
lower bound and a 2EXPTIME upper bound. We close the gap and prove that the problem is PSPACE-complete. Our upper bound requires several novel language-theoretic constructions on bounded-index approximations of context-free languages. Finally, we address the bounded safety problem, i.e., deciding if no error can be reached by computations in which no contributor nor the leader execute more than a given number k of steps (this does not bound the length of the computation, since the number of contributors is unbounded). We show that (if k is given in unary) the problem is coNP-complete not only for pushdown machines, but also for arbitrary Turing machines. Thus, the safety verification problem when the leader and contributors are poly-time Turing machines is also coNP-complete.
These results show that non-atomicity substantially reduces the complexity of verification. In the atomic case, contributors can ensure that they are the only ones that receive a message: the first contributor that reads the message from the store can also erase it within the same atomic action. This allows the leader to distribute identities to contributors. As a consequence, the safety problem is at least PSPACE-hard for state machines, and undecidable for pushdown machines (in the atomic case, the safety problem of two pushdown machines is already undecidable). A similar argument shows that the bounded safety problem is PSPACE-hard. In contrast, we get several coNP upper bounds, which opens the way to the application of SAT-solving or SMT-techniques.
Besides intellectual curiosity, our work on this model is motivated by practical distributed protocols implemented on wireless sensor networks. In these systems, a central co-ordinator (the base station) communicates with an arbitrary number of massproduced tiny agents (or motes) that run concurrently and asynchronously. The motes have limited computational power, and for some systems such as vehicular networks anonymity is a requirement [21] . Further, they are susceptible to crash faults. Implementing atomic communication primitives in this setting is expensive and can be problematic: for instance, a process might crash while holding a lock. Thus, protocols in these systems work asynchronously and without synchronization primitives. Our algorithms provide the foundations for safety verification of these systems. Related Works. Parameterized verification problems have been extensively studied both theoretically and practically. It is a computationally hard problem: the reachability problem is undecidable even if each process has a finite state space [2] . For this reason, special cases have been extensively studied. They vary according to the main characteristics of the systems to verify like the communication topology of the processes (array, tree, unordered, etc); their communication primitives (shared memory, unreliable broadcasts, (lossy) queues, etc); or whether processes can distinguish from each other (using ids, a distinguished process, etc). Prominent examples include broadcast protocols [13, 15, 10, 9] , where finite-state processes communicate via broadcast messages, asynchronous programs [16, 25] , where finite-state processes communicate via unordered channels, finite-state processes communicating via ordered channels [1] , micro architectures [22] , cache coherence protocols [11, 7] , communication protocols [12] , multithreaded shared-memory programs [5, 8, 20, 24] .
Besides the model of Hague [18] , the closest model to ours that has been previously studied [17] is that of distributed computing with identity-free, asynchronous processors and non-atomic registers. The emphasis there was the development of distributed algorithm primitives such as time-stamping, snapshots, and consensus, using either unbounded registers or an unbounded number of bounded registers.
It was left open if these primitives can be implemented using a bounded number of bounded registers. Our decidability results indicate that this is not possible: the safety verification problem would be undecidable if such primitives could be implemented.
Formal Model: Non-Atomic Networks
We describe our formal model, called non-atomic networks. We take a languagetheoretic view, identifying a system with the language of its executions.
Preliminaries. A labeled transition system (LTS) is a quadruple T = (Σ, Q, δ, q 0 ), where Σ is a finite set of action labels, Q is a (non necessarily finite) set of states, q 0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and δ ⊆ Q × Σ ∪ {ε} × Q is the transition relation, where ε is the empty string. We write q a −→q for (q, a, q ) ∈ δ. For σ ∈ Σ * , we write q σ −→q if there exist q 1 , . . . , q n ∈ Q and a 0 , . . . , a n ∈ Σ ∪ {ε}, q a 0 −→q 1 a 1 −→q 2 · · · q n a n −→q such that a 0 · · · a n = σ. The sequence q · · · q is called a path and σ its label. A trace of T is a sequence σ ∈ Σ * such that q 0
To model concurrent executions of LTSs, we introduce two operations on languages: the shuffle and the asynchronous product. The shuffle of two words x, y ∈ Σ * is the
Shuffle is associative, and so we can write
is the language L over the alphabet Σ = Σ 1 ∪ Σ 2 such that w ∈ L iff the projections of w to Σ 1 and Σ 2 belong to L 1 and L 2 , respectively.
1 If a language consists of a single word, e.g. L 1 = {w 1 }, we abuse notation and write w 1 L 2 . Asynchronous product is also associative, and so we write
Let T 1 , . . . , T n be LTSs, where
. . , q 0n ), and a transition (q 1 , . . . , q n ) a −→(q 1 , . . . , q n ) iff (q i , a, q i ) ∈ δ i for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n and q j = q j for every j i. Interleaving models parallel composition of LTSs that do not
. . , T n is the LTS having n i=1 Σ i as set of actions, Q 1 × · · · × Q n as set of states, (q 01 , . . . , q 0n ) as initial state, and a transition (q 1 , . . . , q n ) a −→(q 1 , . . . , q n ) if and only if 1. a ε and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n either a Σ i and q i = q i or a ∈ Σ i and (q i , a, q i ) ∈ δ i , or; 2. a = ε, and there is 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that (q i , ε, q i ) ∈ δ i and q j = q j for every j i. Asynchronous parallel composition models the parallel composition of LTSs in which an action a must be simultaneously executed by every LTSs having a in its alphabet. L(T 1 · · · T n ), the language of the asynchronous parallel composition, is n i=1 L(T i ). 1 Observe that the L 1 L 2 depends on L 1 , L 2 and also their underlying alphabet Σ 1 and Σ 2 .
Non-atomic networks. We fix a finite non-empty set G of global values. A read-write alphabet is any set of the form A × G, where A is a set of read and write actions, or just reads and writes. We denote a letter (a, g) ∈ A × G by a(g), and write G(a 1 , . . . , a n ) instead of {a 1 , . . . , a n } × G.
In what follows, we consider LTSs over read-write alphabets. We fix two LTSs D and C, called the leader and the contributor, with alphabets G(r d , w d ) and G(r c , w c ), respectively, where r d , r c are called reads and w c , w d are called writes. We write w (respectively, r ) to stand for either w c or w d (respectively, r c or r d ). We also assume that for each value g ∈ G there is a transition in the leader or contributor which reads or writes g (if not, the value is never used and is removed from G).
Additionally, we fix an LTS S called a store, whose states are the global values of G and whose transitions, labeled with the read-write alphabet, represent possible changes to the global values on reads and writes. No read is enabled initially. Formally, the store is an LTS S = (Σ, G ∪ {g 0 }, δ S , g 0 ), where Σ = G(r d , w d , r c , w c ), g 0 is a designated initial value not in G, and δ S is the set of transitions g r (g) −→g and g w (g) −→ g for all g ∈ G and all g ∈ G ∪ {g 0 } . Observe that fixing D and C also fixes S. Definition 1. Given a pair (D, C) of a leader D and contributor C, and k ≥ 1, define
We omit the prefix (D, C) when it is clear from the context.
The safety verification problem. A trace of a (D, C)-network N is unsafe if it ends with an occurrence of w c (#), where # is a special value of G. Intuitively, an occurrence of w c (#) models that the contributor raises a flag because some error has occurred. A (D, C)-network N is safe iff its language contains no unsafe trace, namely L(N) ∩ Σ * w c (#) = ∅. (We could also require the leader to write #, or to reach a certain state; all these conditions are easily shown equivalent.) Given a machine M having an LTS semantics over some read-write alphabet, we denote its LTS by M . Given machines M D and M C over read-write alphabets, The safety verification problem for machines M D and M C consists of deciding if the ( M D , M C )-network is safe. Notice that the size of the input is the size of the machines, and not the size of the LTSs thereof, which might even be infinite.
Our goal is to characterize the complexity of the safety verification problem considering various types of machines for the leader and the contributors. We first establish some fundamental combinatorial properties of non-atomic networks.
Simulation and Monotonicity
We prove two fundamental combinatorial properties of non-atomic networks: the Simulation and Monotonicity Lemmas. Informally, the Simulation Lemma states that a leader cannot distinguish an unbounded number of contributors from the parallel composition of at most |G| simulators-LTSs derivable from the contributors, one for each value of G. The Monotonicity Lemma states that non-minimal traces (with respect to a certain subword order) can be removed from a simulator without the leader "noticing", and, symmetrically, non-maximal traces can be removed from the leader without the simulators "noticing".
Simulation
First writes and useless writes. Let σ be a trace. The first write of g in σ by a contributor is the first occurrence of w c (g) in σ. A useless write of g by a contributor is any occurrence of w c (g) that is immediately overwritten by another write. For technical reasons, we additionally assume that useless writes are not first writes. 6 where we have numbered occurrences, w c (g 2 ) 2 is a first write of g 2 , and w c (g 2 ) 5 is a useless write of g 2 (even though w c (g 2 ) 2 is immediately overwritten).
We make first writes and useless writes explicit by adding two new actions f c and u c to our LTSs, and adequately adapting the store.
Definition 2. The extension of an LTS
, where f , u are the first write and useless write actions, respectively, and
We define an extended store, whose states are triples (g, W, b), where g ∈ G, W : G → {0, 1} is the write record, and b ∈ {0, 1} is the useless flag. Intuitively, W records the values written by the contributors so far. If W(g) = 0, then a write to g must be a first write, and otherwise a regular write or a useless write. The useless flag is set to 1 by a useless write, and to 0 by other writes. When set to 1, the flag prevents the occurrence of a read. The flag only ensures that between a useless write and the following write no read happens, i.e., that a write tagged as useless will indeed be semantically useless. A regular or first write may be semantically useless or not.
-G E is the set of triples (g, W, b), where g ∈ G∪{g 0 }, W : G → {0, 1}, and b ∈ {0, 1}; -c 0 is the triple (g 0 , W 0 , 0), where W 0 (g) = 0 for every g ∈ G; -δ S E has a transition (g, W, b) a −→(g , W , b ) where g ∈ G iff one of the following conditions hold:
• a = r (g), g = g, W = W, and b = b = 0; In the sequel, we use sequences of first writes to partition sets of traces. Define Υ to be the (finite) set of sequences over G(f c ) with no repetitions. By the very idea of "first writes" no sequence of Υ writes the same value twice, hence no word in Υ is longer than |G|. Also define Υ # to be those words of Υ which ends with f c (#). Given τ ∈ Υ, define P τ to be the language given by (Σ E \ G(f c )) * ¡ τ. P τ contains all the sequences over Σ E in which the subsequence of first writes is exactly τ. For S ⊆ Υ, P S = σ∈S P σ .
The Copycat Lemma. Intuitively, a copycat contributor is one that follows another contributor in all its actions: it reads or writes the same value immediately after the other reads or writes. Informally, the copycat lemma states that any trace of a non-atomic network can be extended with copycat contributors.
Consider first the non-extended case. Clearly, for every trace of N k there is a trace of N k+1 in which the leader and the first k contributors behave as before, and the (k + 1)-th contributor behaves as a copycat of one of the first k contributors, say the i-th: if the i-th contributor executes a read r c (g), then the (k + 1)-th contributor executes the same read immediately after, and the same for a write.
For the case of extended networks, a similar result holds, but the copycat copies a first write by a regular write: if the i-th contributor executes an action other than f c (g), the copycat contributor executes the same action immediately after, but if the i-th contributor executes f c (g), then the copycat executes w c (g).
We say u is compatible with M following τ iff
* and let M be a multiset of words over G(r c , f c , w c , u c ). If u is compatible with M, then u is compatible with every M obtained by erasing symbols from G(r c ) and G(u c ) from the words of M.
Proof. Erasing reads and useless writes (that no one reads) by contributors does not affect the sequence of values written to the store and read by someone, hence compatibility is preserved. 
The Simulation Lemma. The simulation lemma states that we can replace unboundedly many contributors by a finite number of LTSs that "simulate" them. In particular the network is safe iff its simulation is safe. Let v ∈ L(C E ). Let #v be the number of times that actions of G(f c , w c ) occur in v, minus one if the last action of v belongs to G(f c , w c ). E.g., #v = 1 for v = f c (g 1 )r c (g 1 ) but #v = 0 for v = r c (g 1 )f c (g 1 ). The next lemma is at the core of the simulation theorem.
We proceed by induction on #M. If #M = 0, then all the words of M belong to G(r c , u c ) * G(f c , w c ), and we are done.
, and β i ε. Let g be the value written by σ, and let v k+1 = α i w c (g). By Lemma 2, u is compatible with {v 1 , . . . , v k+1 }, and so there is v ∈ u L(S E ) ¡ k+1 i=1 v i in which the write σ of v i occurs in v immediately before the write of v k+1 . We now let the writes occur in the reverse order, which amounts to replacing v i by v i = α i u c (g) β i and v k+1 by v k+1 = α i σ. This yields a new multiset M = M {v i } ⊕ {v i , v k+1 } compatible with u. Since #M = #M − 1, we then apply the induction hypothesis to M , obtainM and we are done.
¡ g∈G S g which we call the simulation of N E .
Then u is compatible with a set S = {s g } g∈G where s g ∈ L(S g ).
Proof. Let us partition the multiset M as {M g } g∈G such that M g contains exactly the traces of M ending with f c (g) or w c (g). Note that some M g might be empty. Each nonempty M g is of the form M g = {x 1 f c (g), x 2 w c (g), . . . , x n w c (g)} where n ≥ 1, and x i ∈ G(r c , u c ) * for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Define M g as empty if M g is empty, and M g as M g together with n − 1 copies of x 1 w c (g). The copycat lemma shows that u is compatible with ⊕ g∈G M g . Let us now define the multiset M g to be empty if M g is empty, and the multiset of exactly n elements given by x 1 f c (g) and n − 1 copies of x 1 w c (g) if M g is not empty. Again we show that u is compatible with ⊕ g∈G M g . The reason is that the number n − 1 of actions w c (g) in each M g does not change (compared to M g ) and each w c (g) action can happen as soon as f c (g) has occurred. Now define S consisting of one trace s g for each g ∈ G such that s g = ε if M g = ∅; and s g = x 1 f c (g) w c (g) n−1 if M g consists of x 1 f c (g) and n − 1 copies of x 1 w c (g). We have that u is compatible with S because the number of f c (g) and w c (g) actions in M g and s g does not change and each w c (g) action can happen as soon as f c (g) has occurred. Note that it need not be the case that s g ∈ L(C E ). However each s g ∈ L(S g ) (recall that each L(S g ) is prefix closed). Corollary 1. Let u ∈ L(D) and let M = {v 1 , . . . , v k } be a multiset over L(C E ) compatible with u. Then u is compatible with a set S = {s g } g∈G where s g ∈ L(S g ).
In Lemmas 1,2,3 and 4 and Corollary 1 compatibility is preserved. We can further show that it is preserved following a given sequence of first writes. For example, in Lem. 3 if u is compatible with M following τ then u is compatible withM following τ.
The hypothesis and the definition of N E shows that there is k ≥ 1 such that
such that u is compatible with M following τ. Corollary 1 shows that u is compatible following τ with a set S = {s g } g∈G where s g ∈ L(S g ). Therefore we have
The hypothesis and the definition of
The prefix closure of L(S g ) shows that either x g does not have a first write or
In the former case, that is x g ∈ G(r c , u c ) * , Lemma 1 shows that discarding the trace does not affect compatibility. Then define the multiset M containing for each remaining trace x g = v g f c (g)w c (g) n g the trace v g f c (g) and n g traces v g w c (g). M contains no other element. Using a copycat-like argument, it is easy to show M is compatible with u and further that compatibility follows τ. Finally, because v g f c (g) ∈ L(C E ) ∩ G(r c , u c ) * G( f c ) and because C E is the extension of C we find that every trace of M is also a trace of C E , hence that there exists k
Let us now prove an equivalent safety condition.
Proof. From the semantics of non-atomic networks, N is unsafe if and only if
L(N) ∩ (Σ * w c (#)) ∅, equivalently, L(N E )∩(Σ * E f c (#)) ∅ (by definition of extension), which in turn is equivalent to L(N E )∩P Υ # ∅ (by definition of P Υ # ), if and only if L(N S )∩P Υ # ∅ (by the simulation lemma).
Monotonicity
Before stating the monotonicity lemma, we need some language-theoretic definitions. For an alphabet Σ, define the subword ordering ⊆ Σ * × Σ * on words as u v iff u results from v by deleting some occurrences of symbols. Let
Observe that for every u, v ∈ S such that u ≺ v: if S is a cover then so is S \ {u}, and if S is a support then so is S \ {v}.
Recall that N S = D S E ¡ g∈G S g . It is convenient to introduce a fourth, redundant component that does not change L(N S ), but exhibits important properties of it. Recall that the leader cannot observe the reads of the contributors, and does not read the values introduced by useless writes. We introduce a local copy S E D of the store with alphabet G(r d , w d , f c , w c ) that behaves like S E for writes and first writes of the contributors, but has neither contributor reads nor useless writes in its alphabet. Formally: 
It follows easily from this definition that
Lemma 6 (Monotonicity Lemma). Let τ ∈ Υ and letL τ be a cover of L(DS) ∩ P τ . For every g ∈ G, let L g be a support of L g , and let S g be an LTS such that L(
The proof of the monotonicity lemma breaks down into monotonicity for the contributors (Lemma 7) and for the leader (Lemma 9).
Lemma 7 (Contributor Monotonicity Lemma). For every g ∈ G, let L g be a support of L g , and let S g be an LTS such that L(
and L g ⊆ L g we find that for every word w ∈ L g \L g there exists a word w ∈ L g resulting from w by erasing symbols in G(u c , r c ) . Hence, Lemma 1 shows that erasing symbols in G(u c , r c ) does not affect compatibility. The proof concludes by observing that compatibility is further preserved for τ, and we are done.
The leader monotonicity lemma requires the following technical observation.
3 The proof of Lem. 8 is by induction on the number of those factors.
Lemma 9 (Leader Monotonicity Lemma
We conclude from the hypothesis that there exists
Complexity of safety verification of non-atomic networks
Recall that the safety verification problem for machines M D and M C consists in deciding if the ( M D , M C )-network is safe. Notice that the size of the input is the size of the machines, and not the size of its LTSs, which might even be infinite. We study the complexity of safety verification for different machine classes. Given two classes of machines D, C (like finite-state machines or pushdown machines, see below), we define the class of (D,C)-networks as the set ( D , C )-network | D ∈ D, C ∈ C and denote by Safety(D, C) the restriction of the safety verification problem to pairs of machines M D ∈ D and M C ∈ C. We study the complexity of the problem when leader and contributors are finite-state machines (FSM) and pushdown machines (PDM). 4 In this paper a FSM is just another name for a finite-state LTS, and the LTS A of a FSM A is A, i.e. A = A. We define the size |A| of a FSM A as the size of its transition relation. A (read/write) pushdown machine is a tuple P = (Q, G(r, w), Γ, ∆, γ 0 , q 0 ), where Q is a finite set of states including the initial state q 0 , Γ is a stack alphabet that contains the initial stack symbol γ 0 , and
is a set of rules. A configuration of a PDM P is a pair (q, y) ∈ Q × Γ * . The LTS P over G(r, w) associated to P has Q × Γ * as states, (q 0 , γ 0 ) as initial state, and a transition (q, γy) a −→(q , y y) iff (q, γ, a, q , y ) ∈ ∆. Define the size of a rule (q, γ, a, q , y ) ∈ ∆ as |y | + 5 and the size |P| of a PDM as the sum of the size of rules in ∆. Determinism. We show that lower bounds (hardness) for the safety verification problems can be achieved already for deterministic machines. An LTS T over a read-write alphabet is deterministic if for every state s and every pair of transitions s a 1 −→s 1 and s a 2 −→s 2 , if s 1 s 2 then a 1 and a 2 are reads, and they read different values. Intuitively, for any state of a store S, a deterministic LTS T can take at most one transition in S T . A (D, C)-network is deterministic if D and C are deterministic LTSs. Given a class X of machines, we denote by dX the subclass of machines M of X such that M is a deterministic LTS over the read-write alphabet. Notice that this notion does not coincide with the usual definition of a deterministic automaton.
The observation is that a network with non-deterministic processes can be simulated by deterministic ones while preserving safety; intuitively, the inherent non-determinism of interleaving can simulate non-deterministic choice in the machines.
Lemma 10 (Determinization Lemma
and (q 4 , w d (g), q ). Let q 0 be the initial state of C. We add two new statesq andq to C and the transitions (q 0 , r c (nd),q)(q, w c (0),q)(q, w c (1), q 0 ). Finally, we extend the store to accommodate the new values {0, 1, nd}. It follows that D has one fewer pair of non-deterministic transitions than D. Similar transformations can eliminate other nondeterministic transitions (e.g., two writes from a state) or non-determinism in C.
Complexity of Safety Verification for FSMs and PDMs
We characterize the complexity of the safety verification problem of non-atomic networks depending on the nature of the leader and the contributors. We show:
We show hardness by a reduction from 3SAT to the complement of the safety verification problem. Given a 3SAT formula, we design a non-atomic network in which the leader and contributors first execute a protocol that determines an assignment to all variables, and uses subsets of contributors to store this assignment. For a variable x, the leader writes x to the store, inviting proposals for values. On reading x, contributors non-deterministically write either "x is 0" or "x is 1" on the store, possibly over-writing each other. At a future point, the leader reads the store, reading the proposal that was last written, say "x is 0." The leader then writes "commit x is 0" on the store. Every contributor that reads this commitment moves to a state where it returns 0 every time the value of x is asked for. Contributors that do not read this message are stuck and do not participate further. The commitment to 1 is similar. This protocol ensures that each variable gets assigned a consistent value.
Then, the leader checks that each clause is satisfied by querying the contributors for the values of variables (recall that contributors return consistent values) and checking each clause locally. If all clauses are satisfied, the leader writes a special symbol #. The safety verification problem checks that # is never written, which happens iff the formula is unsatisfiable. Finally, Lemma 10 ensures all processes are deterministic. 
) has a support captured by those paths in C E starting from the initial state and whose label ends by f c (g) and in which no state is entered more than once. Therefore if C E has k states then the set of paths starting from the initial state, of length at most k + 1 and whose label ends with
Note that this last check does not directly provide a NP algorithm for non-safety because, due to the write records, S E is exponentially larger than |G|. So, we proceed by pushing down sequences of first writes and obtain the following equivalent statement:
∅. Now, we get an NP algorithm as follows: (a) guess τ ∈ Υ # (this can be done in time polynomial in |G|); (b) construct in polynomial time a FSA A 1 for L(S E )∩ P τ (A 1 results from S E by keeping the |τ| write records corresponding to τ); (c) for each g ∈ τ, guess z g ∈ L g (the guess can be done in polynomial time); (d) guess z ∈ (¡ g∈G z g ) ∩ P τ (this fixes a sequence of reads, useless writes and first writes of the contributors according to τ); (e) construct in polynomial time a FSA A 2 such that L(A 2 ) is the least language containing z and if αf c (g)β 1 β 2 ∈ L(A 2 ) then αf c (g)β 1 w c (g)β 2 ∈ L(A 2 ) (intuitively we add selfloops with write actions of G(w c ) to the FSA accepting z such that w c (g) occurs provided f c (g) has previously occurred); (f) construct in time polynomial in
We continue with the following results showing that even if all processes but the leader are given a stack then the safety verification problem remains in coNP. A detailed proof is given in Appendix C. PSPACE-hardness is shown by reduction from the acceptance problem of a polynomialspace deterministic Turing machine. The proof is technical. The leader and contributors simulate steps of the Turing machine in rounds. The stack is used to store configurations of the Turing machine. In each round, the leader sends the current configuration of the Turing machine to contributors by writing the configuration one element at a time on to the store and waiting for an acknowledgement from some contributor that the element was received. The contributors receive the current configuration and store the next configuration on their stacks. In the second part of the round, the contributors send back the configuration to the leader. The leader and contributors use their finite state to make sure all elements of the configuration are sent and received.
Additionally, the leader and the contributors use the stack to count to 2 n steps. If both the leader and some contributor count to 2 n in a computation, the construction ensures that the Turing machine has been correctly simulated for 2 n steps, and the simulation is successful. The counting eliminates bad computation sequences in which contributors conflate the configurations from different steps due to asynchronous reads and writes.
Next we sketch the upper PSPACE bound that uses constructions on approximations of context-free languages. The details of the proof are available in Appendix E.
Theorem 5. Safety(PDM, PDM) is in PSPACE.
Proof. Let P D and P C be PDMs respectively generating D = P D and C = P C , hence L(D) and L(C) are context-free languages. Proposition 1 shows that the (D,
(by (1)). From the construction of the Simulation Lemma, for each g ∈ G the language
and so is L(S g
). Given P C we compute in polynomial time a PDA P g such that
2) follows from definition of S g and L g = L(P g ); (3) follows from Lem. 6 and by lettingL τ and L(P g ) be a cover and support of L(DS) ∩ P τ and L(P g ), respectively.
Next, for all g ∈ G we compute a FSA A g such that L(A g ) is a support of L(P g ). Our first language-theoretic construction shows that the FSA A g can be computed in time exponential but space polynomial in |P g |. Then, because L(S E ) is a regular language, we compute in space polynomial in
. Hence, by (3) and because of Υ # (guessing and checking τ ∈ Υ # is done in time polynomial in |G|) we find that it suffices to proveL τ L(A C ) ∅ is decidable in space polynomial in
To compute a coverL τ of L(DS) ∩ P τ , we need results about the k-index approximations of a context-free language [4] . Given a CFG G in CNF and k ≥ 1, we define the k-index approximation of L(G), denoted by L (k) (G), consisting of the words of L(G) having a derivation in which every intermediate word contains at most k occurrences of variables. We further introduce an operator which, given G and FSA A, computes in polynomial time a context-free grammar G A such that L(G A) = L(G) L(A). We prove the following properties:
, where m is the number of variables of G;
for every FSA
Equipped with these results, the proof proceeds as follows. Let G D be a context-free grammar such that L(G D ) = L(P D ). It is well-known that G D can be computed in time polynomial in |P D |. Next, given τ, we compute a grammar
It can be done in time polynomial in |P D | + |P C | because it is a restriction of S E where write records are totally ordered according to τ and there are exactly |τ| of them. Therefore we obtain, We note that our three language-theoretic constructions (the construction of automaton A g that is a cover of L(P g ) of size at most exponential in |P g |, and results 1, 2, and 3 in the proof above) improve upon previous constructions, and are all required for the optimal upper bound. Hague [18] shows an alternate doubly exponential construction using a result of Ehrenfeucht and Rozenberg in place of Theorem 7. This gave a 2EXPTIME algorithm. Even after using our exponential time construction for A g , we can only get an EXPTIME algorithm, since the non-emptiness problem for (general) context-free languages is P-complete [19] . Our bounded-index approximation for the cover and the space-efficient emptiness algorithm for bounded-index languages are crucial to the PSPACE upper bound.
The bounded safety problem
Given k > 0, we say that a (D, C)-network is k-safe if all traces in which the leader and each contributor make at most k steps are safe; i.e., we put a bound of k steps on the runtime of each contributor, and consider only safety within this bound. Here, a step consists of a read or a write of the shared register. The bound does not limit the total length of traces, because the number of contributors is unbounded. The bounded safety problem asks, given D, C, and k written in unary, if the (D, C)-network is k-safe.
Given a class of (D,C)-networks, we define BoundedSafety(D, C) as the restriction of the k-safety problem to pairs of machines M D ∈ D and M C ∈ C, where we write k in unary. A closer look to Theorem 1 shows that its proof reduces the satisfiability problem for a formula φ to the bounded safety problem for a (D,C)-network and a number k, all of which have polynomial size |φ|. This proves that BoundedSafety(dFSM, dFSM) is coNP-hard. We show that, surprisingly, bounded safety remains coNP-complete for pushdown systems, and, even further, for arbitrary Turing machines. Notice that the problem is already coNP-complete for one single Turing machine.
We sketch the definition of the Turing machine model (TM), which differs slightly from the usual one. Our Turing machines have two kind of transitions: the usual transitions that read and modify the contents of the work tape, and additional transitions with labels in G(r, w) for communication with the store. The machines are input-free, i.e., the input tape is always initially empty. i j parts provide the writes necessary to execute the reads of the s g sequences, and there are at most k · (m + 1) ≤ k · (n + 1) of them, the numbers can be chosen so that i 1 , . . . , i m ≤ O(n · k) holds.
We present a nondeterministic polynomial algorithm that decides if the (D, C)-network is k-unsafe. The algorithm guesses τ ∈ Υ # and traces u, s g 1 , . . . , s g m of length at most k. Since there are at most n + 1 of those traces, this can be done in polynomial time. Then, the algorithm guesses numbers i 1 , . . . , i m . Since the numbers can be chosen so that i 1 , . . . , i m ≤ O(n · k), this can also be done in polynomial time. Finally, the algorithm guesses an interleaving of u, s A TM is poly-time if it takes at most p(n) steps for some polynomial p, where n is the size of (the description of) the machine in some encoding. As a corollary, we get that the safety verification problem when leaders and contributors are poly-time Turing machines is coNP-complete. Note that the coNP upper bound holds even though the LTS corresponding to a poly-time TM is exponentially larger than its encoding. 
A Combinatorics
Proof (of Lem 8) . 
because, as assumed above, the first symbol of w 2 † is a write action.
B coNP lower bound
Proof (of Theorem 1). We give a reduction from 3SAT to the complement of the safety verification problem. Given a 3SAT formula with n variables and m clauses, we con-struct a deterministic leader D and a deterministic contributor C such that the (D, C)-network writes a special symbol # iff the formula is satisfiable. The leader uses the contributors to guess and store an assignment, and then checks if each clause is satisfied.
Gadget to guess and retrieve a bit. The reduction uses the following protocol between the leader and the contributors to guess a bit and maintain the guess consistently. To assign a value to bit, the leader writes bit to the global store. The contributors who read bit from the store then write consecutively propose-bit-is-i, i = 0, 1, on the store. The leader reads the store at some (non-deterministic) point, and reads the last write by one of the contributors proposing either 0 or 1. If it reads propose-bit-is-0 (the 1 case is identical), it writes back that it commits to setting the bit to 0 (writing commit-bit-is-0). Contributors who read commit-bit-is-0 move on to the next phase, where they deliver bit-is-0 each time they are asked the value of bit. That is, they wait to read a get-value-of-bit message, and reply with bit-is-0.
Similarly, if the leader commits to a 1, contributors who read the message come to the consensus that the bit is 1. Contributors who miss the commit message are stuck. This protocol ensures that the leader and contributors can reach consensus on the value of a bit, and even though they are deterministic, the value of the bit is chosen nondeterministically, based on when the leader reads a value (propose-bit-is-i, i = 0, 1) from the store. Notice that an arbitrary number of contributors can participate and potentially overwrite each other, but the bit is fixed to a chosen value. Reduction from 3SAT. The leader uses the above protocol to "assign" non-deterministically chosen consensus values to each variable x 1 , . . . , x n . Then, it checks sequentially that each clause is satisfied by this assignment. To do this, it gets the literals from the contributors and checks if the clause is satisfied. To get the assigned value to a variable x, the leader writes get-value-of-x on the store. The contributors that are storing an assignment to x (i.e., those who completed the consensus protocol for x) and who read this message, write the consensus value (using values x-is-0 or x-is-1). Even if several contributors write, they write the same value.
Suppose the formula is satisfiable. Then, there is an execution of the protocol where the contributors reach a consensus for each bit corresponding to a satisfying assignment, and the leader succeeds in checking all clauses. Then, the value # gets written to the store and the (D, C)-network is accepting. On the other hand, if the formula is not satisfiable, then the leader never succeeds checking all clauses and # never gets written. Note that the size of D and C is O(m + n) and that they are deterministic.
C coNP upper bound
We first recall some basic structural property of FSAs. Define the reachability relation of a FSA as follows: state s 1 is reachable from s 2 iff there is a (possibly empty) path from s 2 to s 1 . We define a strongly connected component (scc) of a FSA as an equivalence class for the mutual reachability relation. Proof. A path in a FSA is said to be accepting if its first and last state are initial and final respectively. Let π be an accepting path in A such that no state repeats in π. Define A π to be the FSA that consists exactly of (1) the states and transitions of π; and (2) the states and transitions of the sccs visited by π.
Clearly, A π results from removing states and transitions from A. Define the set {A 1 , . . . , A d } such that each accepting path π with no repeating state induces exactly one automaton A π ∈ {A 1 , . . . , A d }. This set is finite since there are only finitely many states and transitions in A. Furthermore, it is easily checked that
We turn to point 3. Because no state is repeated, π fixes a total order on the sccs it visits (and are also included in A π ). So any two accepting paths in A π must visit the sccs in that order. Therefore, it suffices to show that given a scc, any two traces drawn upon that scc are covered by a third one. This is easily seen from the definition of subword ordering and the fact that in a scc all states are mutually reachable.
Hence, the alphabet of LL g is given by G(r c , u c ) ∪ {f c (g), w c (g)}.
Proof. Let x ∈ ¡ g ∈G 1 LL g and y ∈ LL g . We prove:
Let v = v 0 . . . v n−1 , where v i ∈ G(r d , w d , f c , w c ) for each i, 0 ≤ i < n, and consider the asynchronous product v L(S E ). We define the LTS Q over alphabet Σ E as follows. The states of Q are the set (V i , g) | 0 ≤ i ≤ n, g ∈ G ∪ $ . The initial state is (V 0 , $). There is a transition (V i , g) a −→(V j , g ) between two states of Q iff one of the following condition holds:
y ∅ by hypothesis, there exist two words σ x and σ y of Q such that σ x x ∅ and σ y y ∅. Let σ x be the word resulting from erasing all symbols in G(u c , r c ) from σ x , and define σ y similarly. It can be easily checked that σ x = σ y = v. Therefore, there exist α i , β i ∈ G(u c , r c ) * for every i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n such that
The definition of Q further shows that if v i−1 is a read or write to g then α i = r c (g)
for some positive integer i 1 , i 2 and similarly β i = r c (g)
c for some positive integer j 1 , j 2 . Moreover, if i 2 + j 2 > 0 then v i must be a write. Define for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n the word γ i = r c (g)
, and let σ sh = γ 0 v 0 . . . γ n−1 v n−1 γ n . It is routine to check that σ sh ∈ L(Q) holds, and so L(Q) σ sh ∅. Let σ sh be the result of erasing from σ sh all symbols of G(r d , w d ) (which necessarily correspond to symbols of v). Again we find that L(Q) σ sh ∅. Finally, by the definition of γ i and since g G 1 we get σ sh ∈ (x ¡ y), and so L(Q) (x ¡ y) ∅. By the definition of Q this implies v L(S E ) (x ¡ y) ∅, and we are done.
Proof (of Thm. 3). 
The two guesses are of polynomial size, the first in the size of G, the second in the size of the FSA Q τ which can be computed in time polynomial in the size of G and D. Computing the sccs is done in time linear in the size of Q τ using Tarjan's algorithm [6] . Each of the d checks can be made in polynomial time. To see this, we first notice that we can safely replace L(S E ) by L(S E ) ∩ P τ for which an FSM can be computed in polynomial time. Therefore it is clear that each check can be made in polynomial time. Correctness. We want to show that
For the only if direction it suffices to notice that by Lem. 1 and definition of P τ we can restrict the shuffle to those values occurring in τ only. Hence, the definition of L(S g ) and the shuffle operator show the rest.
By repeatedly applying Lemma 11 point 3 we find there exists v ∈ L(q τ ) such that v v i for every i. Furthermore, Lemma 8 shows that v L(S E ) LL g i ∅ for each i. Finally, we conclude from repeated applications of Lemma 12 
) and we are done.
D PSPACE lower bound
Proof (of Theorem 4). We give a reduction from the acceptance problem of a linear space-bounded deterministic Turing machine to the complement of the safety verification problem. Fix a deterministic TM M that on input of size n uses at most n tape cells and accepts in exactly 2 n steps. We are given an input x and want to check if M accepts
x. An accepting run is a sequence of TM configurations c 0 → c 1 → . . . → c 2 n , where c 0 is the initial configuration (the input x is written on the tape, the head points to the leftmost cell, and the TM is in its initial state), there is a transition of the TM from c i to c i+1 for i = 0, . . . , 2 n − 1, and c 2 n is accepting. Following the above assumptions, configurations of M can be encoded by words of fixed length.
We define a (D, C)-network that simulates M and such that D = P D and C = P C where P D and P C are dPDMs. The leader and the contributors co-operatively simulate computations of M using their stack, and also use the stack to count up to 2 n steps. We start by describing the basic gadgets used in the simulation.
Counting to 2 n using n stack symbols. We show how a contributor can use its stack to count down from 2 n . Consider a stack alphabet of with n + 2 symbols {I 0 , . . . , I n } ∪ $ , where $ is a special bottom-of-stack marker. Given a stack over this alphabet, the contributor PDM, provided the top of the stack is I i for some 0 ≤ i ≤ n, performs a decrement operation defined as follows:
1. While the top of the stack is I i for some i > 0, do pop(I i ) ; push(I i−1 ) ; push(I i−1 ); 2. pop(I 0 ) and return; Suppose initially the stack contains I n $ (the bottom of the stack is to the right). Then, we reach a stack with $ on the top exactly after popping I 0 2 n times, that is after performing 2 n times the decrement operation.
Computing one step of the TM. In the construction, we simulate one step of the M by sending a configuration from the leader to contributors, and then sending back the next configuration from contributors to the leader. Assume the reverse of a configuration of the Turing machine is stored as a word w of length n in the stack of the leader and the stack of the contributors is empty. We want to ensure that at the end of the protocol, the stack of the leader contains the reversal of a successor configuration of M, and the stack of the contributor is again empty.
We use the following protocol. The leader and contributors use their finite set of control states to count till n. The leader pops one symbol of w at a time from its stack, writes it on to the global store, and waits for an acknowledgment from some contributor that the symbol has been received. Conversely, the contributors read the letters of w one symbol at a time from the global store. Moreover, using its finite state, the contributors compute the successor configuration of the configuration that is received from the leader and store it on to their stacks. Additionally, a contributor sends an acknowledgment for the receipt of each symbol read from the leader.
After n steps of the leader and contributors, the stack of the leader is empty and the stack of the contributor contains w where w can be reached from w R by executing one step in M.
Notice that at the end of this part of the protocol, in spite of asynchronous reads and writes, the leader is certain that all n symbols were received in order, but not necessarily by the same contributor.
The second part of the protocol sends this configuration back from a contributor to the leader. Again, the leader and the contributor use their finite state to count till n. The contributor sends n symbols one at a time to the leader, and waits for an acknowledgement to check that the leader read the same symbol it transferred. After n steps, the leader's stack contains the reverse of w and the contributor's stack is again empty.
Moreover, the contributor is certain that the entire configuration has been correctly received by the leader.
Notice that even in the presence of non-atomic reads and writes, if the leader and some contributor successfully reach the end of the protocol, then the leader and that particular contributor has faithfully simulated one step of the machine. However, we cannot ensure that the same contributor participated in one whole round of the protocol, always reading and writing the latest values and faithfully simulating one step of the Turing machine. For example, it is possible that several contributors, that have simulated the Turing machine for different number of steps, participate in the protocol. The simulation catches these discrepancies by counting, as described below.
The reduction. Initially, all contributors push I n $ onto their stacks. The leader pushes I n $ onto the stack, and additionally, the reverse of the starting configuration of the Turing machine.
Then, the leader and contributors execute the protocol described above. At the end of the first part of a round, the leader perform a decrement. At the end of the second part of a round, the contributor perform a decrement.
The network accepts the computation (e.g., by outputting a special symbol #) if (1) both the leader and some contributor count up to 2 n , and (2) at that point, the Turing machine is in an accepting configuration.
Notice that if the leader interacts with the same contributor for 2 n rounds, then both of them will simultaneously reduce the counter on the stack to $ at the same time, and thus, would have correctly simulated the Turing machine for 2 n steps. So, if the stack encodes an accepting configuration, the Turing machine accepts.
Conversely, if the leader interacts with multiple contributors in different rounds, then there will not be any contributor whose count reaches 2 n simultaneously with the leader. All such computations are not faithful simulations of the Turing machine and none of them therefore lead to accepting the computation.
Finally, we note that in the above reduction, all processes are deterministic machines.
